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The Supreme Court of the United States
has handed down its final judgment in the long pending case of
Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Central 7Transbortation Co., i8 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 8o8 (May 31, 1898), reversing the Circuit Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania on the question of measure of
damages, and remitting the case to the lower court with directions
to enter judgment for the Central Transportation Company in
accordance with the opinion of the court. This case has excited
the greatest interest, not only on account of the magnitude of the
interests involved, but because of the unsettled status of parties to
an ultra vires contract, together with the peculiar view taken by
the United States Supreme Court of contracts of this character.
The prominence of the parties, the amount involved, the importance
of the question and the recognized abilities of the counsel on both
FERRED THEREUNDER.

NOTES.

sides, makes this in every respect a "leading case" and one which
will no doubt be a mile stone in the development of corporation law
in this country.
Briefly stated, the facts were as follows: In 1870 the Central
Transportation Company, a corporation chartered by the Legislature of Pennsylvania for manufacturing and leasing sleeping cars,
entered into a so-called lease with the Pullman Palace Car Company, by which it turned over to the latter its entire plant and
property, including cars, patent rights and contracts with railroads,
for a term of ninety-nine years, during which time it agreed not to
engage in the manufacturing or hiring of sleeping cars. The consideration for this contract was payment by the Pullman Company
of the sum of $264,ooo annually for the term of ninety-nine years,
in quarterly payments. For fifteen years the parties carried out
this contract strictly, but in 1885, a dispute having arisen, the
-Pullman Company repudiated the lease and refused to pay the
rental. Upon suit being brought for the rent the defence offered
was the illegality of the lease as ultra vires of the Central Transportation Company.
This plea prevailed in the lower court and was affirmed by the
Supreme Court in Central TransportationCo. v. Pullman Palace
Car Co., 139 U. S. 24 (1891). In that case Mr. Justice Gray, in
affirming the judgment of the lower court, used the following language : "A contract of a corporation which is ultra vires, in the
proper sense, that is to say, outside the object of its creation as
defined in the law of its organization, and therefore beyond the
powers conferred upon it by the legislature, is not voidable only,
but wholly void and of no legal effect. The objection to the contract is, not merely that the corporation ought not to have made it,
but that it could not make it. The contract cannot be ratified by
either party, because it could not have been authorized by either.
No performance on either side can give the unlawful contract any
validity or be the foundation of any right of action upon it."
Had the court stopped here it would have left the plaintiff in a
peculiarly unfortunate position and would have laid the law open
to a fair charge of extreme harshness. But, though refusing to
acknowledge any potency in the ultra vires contract or to recognize it in any way as a basis of action, the court further on suggested
a ground of relief which has since been acted upon and a fair measure
of justice secured. Mr. Justice Gray's language, in pointing out
the true ground for recovery, was as follows :
"A contract ultra vires being unlawful and void, not because it
is in itself immoral, but because the corporation, by the law of its
creation, is incapable of making it, the courts, while refusing to
maintain any action upon the unlawful contract, have always striven
to do justice between the parties, so far as could be done consistently
with adherence to law, by permitting property or money, parted
with on the faith of the unlawful contract, to be recovered back,
or compensation to be made for it. In such case, however, the

NOTES.

action is not maintained upon the unlawful contract, nor according
to its terms; but on an implied contract of the defendant to return
or, failing to that, to make compensation for property or money
which it has no right to retain. To maintain such an action is not
to affirm but to disaffirm the unlawful contract."
Pending this decision the Pullman Company had filed a bill in
the Circuit Court asking that the Central Company should be
enjoined from bringing additional suits for rent as the quarterly
payments came due. Acting upon the hint given by the Supreme
Court in its judgment, the Central Company filed a cross bill praying relief by return of its property or compensation for same, and
also that the Pullman Company should account for all profits made
by it through use of said property, and that the Pullman Company
should be adjudged a trustee for the Central Company of all contracts for transportation, whether original, new, or renewals, held
by the Pullman Company with railroads with which there were
contracts of transportation with the Central Company at the time
of the making of the lease in I87O. The court referred the case
to a master with directions to ascertain the value of the property
when transferred, together with its earnings since, less amount paid
as rental. The master reported in favor of the Central Company
for the sum of $4,235,044 with costs, and exceptions to report
having been dismissed, judgment was so entered. From this judgment appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of the United States,
and final judgment upon this appeal has now been entered.
The court denies that there is any question of trusteeship in the
case and holds that the Pullman Company is only liable for the
value of the property belonging to the Central Company held by it,
together with interest from date of repudiation of the lease. It is
to the basis of calculating the value of this property by the master
that the chief objection of the court is directed. The master,
having first assumed that the value of the property was the same in
i885 as in 1870, took the very simple and easy method of ascertaining its value by taking the value of the Central Company's stock in
the open market in 1870 which was 58, the par value being 5o,
thus placing the value in 1885 at $2,552,000, which sum he
allowed with interest from that date, making the total sum
$4, 235,044- The court, however, points out that the market price
of the Central Company's stock could not be taken as a true basis
of the value of their property, since the market price of the stock
simply represented the view taken by investors, or, it may be, speculators, in the supposed value of the property and was based upon
the value of the property, value of leases, patent rights, future
prospects and perhaps faith in the skill of the officers of the company. But, as it points out, the leases and patent rights held by
the Central Company and transferred by it had all run out or
expired during the fifteen years of the continuance of the lease, and
the anhual payments made by the Pullman Company during that
time had presumably paid the Central Company their full value,
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for at the time of the repudiation of the lease, their value was nil.
There was, therefore, nothing to be taken into account but the
actual value of property turned over to the Pullman Company,
which the court found to consist of cars and equipments valued at
$710,846.50, together with cash amounting to $17,000, making a
total valuation of $727,846.50, for which amount judgment was
entered with interest from 1885 with costs.
The court agreed with the master that, in absence of evidence to
the contrary and in view of the fact that the Pullman Company had
agreed to keep the property in good order and repair, they would
assume that the value of the property was the same in 1885 as in
1870.
The decision in this case is thoroughly consistent with the
numerous decisions by the court in cases involving ultra vires leases,
of which this is a fair type, and from the standpoint taken by the
court the basis of settlement seems to be perfectly fair and logically
correct. See, in this connection, Thomas v. W. J. R. R., ioi U. S.
71 (1879); Penna. R. R. Co. v. St. Louis, Etc., Ry. Co., ii8
U. S. 307 (1885) ; Penna. 2. ?. Co. v. Keokuk Bridge. Co., 131
U. S. 371 (1888) ; Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Central Trans.
Co., 139 U. S. 24 (1891) ; St. Louis, Vandalia, Etc., R. R. v.
Terre -Haute, Etc., R. R., 145 U. S. 393 (1891).
It is to be
noted that there is a seeming inconsistency between the views taken
by the court in Thomas v. W.. jR. R. and in the Vandalia case.
In the former the defendant, having repudiated the lease as ultra
vires, received the commendation of the court for having so acted,
since, the lease being illegal, the defendant merely did what it should
have done. In the latter case the plaintiff company having filed a
bill asking that the ultra "vireslease be cancelled, the court refused
to interfere, on the ground that the parties having placed themselves
in the position in which they then were and being in pari delicto,
no relief would be granted.
This would seem to be an extension of the application of the
maxim in paridelicto, since in this case the plaintiff to the illegal
contract was in default, while heretofore the maxim has been
invoked only in cases where the plaintiff has sought relief, the
defendant being in default. In any event it seems difficult to see
why the West Jersey Railroad Company should be commended for
repudiating a void lease while the Vandalia Company should be
denied the right to do so. Perhaps the explanation would be that
the latter company asked the court to help it in the matter. If it
had deliberately-repudiated the lease and refused to pay the rental
and thus compelled the other party to the lease to sue, it would
have been in the same position as was the West Jersey Railroad
Company.
While the position of the Supreme Court upon the question of
recovery of property parted with under an ultra vires lease has many
critics, and is not followed in many of the states where recovery is
allowed upon the lease itself in cases involving no moral turpitude,
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as in Oil Creek R. R. v. Penna. Trans. Co., 83 Pa. 16o (1876) ;
State Board of Agriculture v. St. Ry. CO., 47 Ind. 407 (1874) ;
Whitney Arms Co. v. Barlow, 63 N. Y. 62 (1875) ; Hall Afanf'g
Co. v. American Ry. Supply CO., 48 Mich. 331 (x882) ; yet it is
now well settled and is no longer a debatable question. The court
has clearly and consistently expressed and carried out its views as to
the proper form of suit and grounds of recovery, and nothing now
remains upon the part of members of the Bar but to act accordingly.
EXPERT TESTIMONY; PHYSICIAN; REFUSAL TO TESTIFY;

EXTRA

From the great mass of expert testimony that is
daily heard in the courts one would surmise that some of the vexed
problems this class of testimony raises are nearing a final decision.
The Supreme Court of Illinois, in Dixon v. The People, 168 Ill.
179, 48 N. E. io8, opinion by Mr. Justice Magruder (Nov. I,
1897), has added another decision to a question argued at so ie
length by a number of able text writers. The question presented
in this case is whether a physician, subpoenaed and interrogated as
an expert witness only, can refuse to testify upon the ground that
no compensation greater than that allowed to an ordinary witness
has been paid or promised him. The decision in this case, which
was a civil suit, was that the refusal of such physician to answer a
hypothetical question calling for his opinion, on the above grounds,
justifies the trial judge in fining him for contempt.
All authorities, it would seem, agree that in a criminal suit or
where the witness is testifying to facts, that such a proceeding- is
clearly within the power of the court; but many text writers and
some decisions hold that, where the witness is to testify merely as an
expert, he should receive extra compensation for his testimony as
for a professional opinion.
In England, by 5 Eliz. c. 9, a witness must "have tendered to
him, according to his countenance or calling, his reasonable charges;"
and under this statute there were several decisions that held to the
distinction between the case of a man who sees a fact, and a man
who is selected by a party to give his opinion about a matter with
which he is peculiarly conversant: W4ebb v. Paige, I C. & K. 23
(1843) ; Buckleyv. Rice, x Plow. 125 (554) ; but those decisions
have been doubted and there is judicial authority for the statement,
"If the rule were to undergo revision I cannot say it would stand
the test of examination:" Afoorev. Adam, 5 M. & S. i56 (x816);
Collins v. Godfrey,, i B. & Ad. 950 (1831) ; Lonergan v. Royal
Exchange Assurance, 7 Bingh. 731 (1830).
On the strength of these opinions, in the case of Exparte .Dement,
53 Ala. 389 (875), it was decided that a physician or other
expert witness could be held for contempt. This was, as the court
intimates, a test case and the opinion cites the English authorities
at length.
The text writers, and especially those on Medical Jurisprudence,
strongly favor the view that a physician or expert cannot be held
COMPENSATION.
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for contempt under such a state of facts : Wharton on Evidence,
§ 380, 456; 2 Phillips on Evidence, ( 4 th Am. Ed.) 828; Underhill on Evidence, 277; Redfield on Wills, § 31, p. X54, note 44;
Rice on Evidence, Chap. 14, § 197; Taylor on Evidence, § 1135 ;
Taylor's Principals of Medical Jurisprudence, p. 19 ; The Jurisprudence of Medicine in its Relation to the Law of Contracts, Torts
and Evidence, by Ordronaux, §§ i14, 115.
Thus we see a whole field of text writers arrayed against what is now
the constant trend of judicial decision. The most recent and, perhaps, the strongest case favoring the view adopted by the text book
writers is, Buckman v. State, 59 Ind. 1 (1877), which was a decision
by a divided court, and even then eventually based on the Bill of
Rights of the state, § 21, which provides that "no man's particular
services shall be demanded without just compensation." This case,
as well as the other cases of recent years in the United States, is
thoroughly considered by the Illinois court in Dixon v. People
(supra) .
Three grounds are generally advanced to sustain the right of
such extra compensation, viz., (i) That the time of the expert
witness is more valuable than the time of ordinary men; (2) That
the skill and accumulated knowledge of an expert are his property,
and that a man's property should not be taken without just compensation ; (3) Based on Buckman v. State (supra), calling expert
testimony "particular services."
However, the argument against this position is strengthened by
the fact that the Alabama case, Exparte Dement (supra), has been
followed, not only by Dixon v. People (supra), but also by State v.
,pezner,36 Minn. 535 (1887) ; Suinners v. State, 5 Tex. App.
365 (879) ; County Commissioners v. Zee, 3 Colo. App. 177
(1892) ; Flinn v. Prairie County, 6o Ark. 204 (1895).

